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Lasting Victories: Successful Union 
j Strategies for Winning First Contracts 
r KATE BRONFENBRENNER 
Cornell University 
I All too often stunning union election victories turn into devastating first 
; contract defeats through decertification, broken strikes, plant shutdowns, 
I or the outright refusal of the employer to bargain. With a certification elec-
| tion win rate below 50% and a first contract rate of less than 75%, less than 
I a third of workers who vote in NLRB certification elections end up being 
I covered under a union agreement. Despite these dramatic numbers, there 
| has been very little research on factors contributing to union success or 
I failure in first contract campaigns. 
I We know from recent research on public and private sector certifica-
tion election campaigns that union organizing strategies play an extremely 
important role in determining union success in winning certification elec-
tions. Studies such as Bronfenbrenner (1993) found that in an increasingly 
I hostile organizing climate, union success in NLRB campaigns depends on 
I the use of a grassroots, rank-and-file intensive organizing strategy, building 
I the union and acting like a union from the beginning of the campaign. 
I Union campaigns which incorporate tactics such as representative rank-
and-file committees; personal contact through housecalls and small group 
'•; meetings; escalating internal pressure tactics such as solidarity days; the 
use of rank-and-file volunteers from already organized units; a focus on 
f dignity, fairness, and service quality as the primary issues; and building for 
I the first contract during the organizing campaign were found to be associ-
;
 ated with win rates 10% to 30% higher than traditional campaigns that 
focused on mass mailings and gate leafleting. The use of these rank-and-
[ file intensive tactics significantly increased the percentage of the vote 
i received by the union and the probability of the union winning the elec-
• tion, no matter how intense the employer opposition to the campaign. 
t Similarly, in the public sector Bronfenbrenner and Juravich (1995a) 
I found that even in the context of little employer opposition, the use of 
grassroots, rank-and-file intensive strategies not only led to higher win rates 
; in the certification election campaigns but also contributed to significandy 
\ Author's Address: NYSSILR, Cornell University, 207ILR Extension Bldg., Ithaca, NY 
i 14853. 
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higher post-first contract membership rates. Bronfenbrenner and Juravich 
also found that the same rank-and-file intensive organizing strategies, along 
with the quality and degree of union representation before the decertifica-
tion petition was filed, played an extremely important role in determining 
the outcome of decertification campaigns (1995b). 
We know from research by Cooke (1985) and Bronfenbrenner (1994) 
that employer opposition to unionization does not stop with the certifica-
tion election campaign. These studies found that through a combination of 
surface bargaining, captive audience meetings, unilateral changes, dis-
charges for union activity, threats of full or partial plant closings, and con-
cessionary initial proposals, employers were able to reduce union first con-
tract rates by as much as 10 to 50 percentage points. 
These studies leave no doubt that employers have at their disposal a 
myriad of legal and illegal tactics which they can use to effectively block 
union efforts at winning a first agreement. The critical question to be 
answered is whether the same kind of grassroots, rank-and-file intensive 
union-building strategies that have been found to be so effective in certifi-
cation and decertification elections are equally effective in overcoming 
employer opposition in first contract campaigns. 
Theoretical Framework and Hypothesis 
Bargaining outcomes are determined by the relative power of union 
and management. However, as Bacharach and Lawler (1981:40) contend, 
"Tactical action is the most critical component of the bargaining process." 
Contextual factors such as economic and political climate, employer and 
union characteristics, and bargaining unit demographics, along with the 
bargaining process and the nature and outcome of the union organizing 
campaign all influence relative bargaining power, and therefore, all matter 
in determining first contract outcomes. But the strategic choices unions 
and employers make during contract campaigns matter most of all. 
There are many different ways in which union and employer strategies 
and tactics can affect first contract outcomes. First, there are strategies 
which are directed at moderating the effects of contextual factors, such as 
media campaigns, political action, and changes in union or employer struc-
ture and practice. Second, there are strategies that the union and employer 
direct at each other. These include both direct pressure tactics, such as 
strikes and boycotts, and more indirect tactics designed to manipulate the 
opponent s view of each side s bargaining power, such as solidarity days, ral-
lies, and negative publicity campaigns. 
The third category includes those strategies directed at worker support for 
the union campaign. For the union this includes both one-on-one organizing 
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and active membership involvement in the bargaining process and the 
internal and external pressure campaign. Last, there are those union and 
employer strategies directed at the negotiation process itself, including 
decisions about ground rules, proposals, the use of experts, sidebars, and 
the use of fact finding, mediation, or interest arbitration. 
The first contract model used in this study is therefore framed as a 
complex interaction of employer and union tactics, contextual influences, 
organizing campaign and election outcome variables, union negotiator and 
management consultant background, worker support for the contract cam-
paign, and the actual negotiation process itself.1 
The underlying hypothesis of the first contract study is that unions will 
have more success in the first contract process when they utilize a multifac-
eted, rank-and-file intensive campaign strategy involving internal and 
external organizing and pressure tactics. This campaign strategy includes 
the following: the continuation of the one-on-one organizing tactics utilized 
during the certification election campaign, active membership participa-
tion in issue selection and proposal development, an emphasis on union 
democracy and representative participation, an active role for the rank-
and-file bargaining committee at the table and in caucuses, a continued 
focus in union proposals and during the bargaining campaign on broader 
justice and nonworkplace issues rather than simply wages and benefits, an 
emphasis on building community and labor coalitions united in mutual 
support of both workplace and broader community concerns, the use of 
escalating internal pressure and external pressure tactics ranging from soli-
darity days to stockholder actions, and an emphasis on open negotiations 
with regular reporting to the members in newsletters and membership 
meetings. 
Such a strategy may not be required in those units where the employer 
is ready and willing to reach a good first agreement with the union within a 
reasonable time frame. Yet absent such employer acquiescence, unions will 
need this kind of consistent multifaceted union strategy to be able to sus-
tain membership support; counteract the negative impact of a hostile eco-
nomic, legal, and political climate; and convince the employer that it is in 
his or her interest to settle the first contract as soon as possible. 
As described in Table 1, in the empirical model testing this hypothesis, 
the rank-and-file intensive strategy is operationalized as an additive vari-
able ranging from 0, for campaigns where no rank-and-file intensive tactics 
were used, to approximately 16, where all of the tactics were used. It is 
hypothesized that the more of these tactics the union uses in the campaign 
and therefore the greater the additive value of the variable, then the 
greater the likelihood that the union will achieve a first contract. 
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TABLE 1 
Determinants of First Contract Outcome 
Logit Estimation of First Contract Model with Dependent Variable: Contract/No Contract 
Independent Variables 
Contextual Factors 
Bargaining Climate 
% Unemployment 
% Union density 
Company in right 
to work state 
Company Characteristics 
Unit in manufacturing sector 
Company profitable 
Other units under contract 
Unit Demographics 
Average wage $5.00 or less/hour 
60%+ Women and/or Blacks 
in unit 
Organizing Campaign 
nlog(size*percent yes) 
Unit targeted 
Negotiator Background 
Negotiator from international 
Negotiator female or minority 
Negotiator has college degree 
1-25 yrs rank&file experience 
Management Tactic* 
Captive audience meetings 
Employer used media &/or ads 
Unilateral changes 
Used outside consultant/lawyer 
Initial proposals concessionary 
Discharges after election 
Surface bargaining 
Bargaining Proce** 
2 months* Detween elec. & barg. 
Mediator used 
Union Tactic* 
Rank & file intensive campaign 
(additive variable including the fc 
% Housecalled during negotial 
Focus on community issues (+ 
Inside strategies used ( + 1) 
Sample Mean 
Sign or 
-
+ 
+ 
-
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
+ 
+ 
blowing) 
fens (+%) 
1) 
Sidebars reported to committee (+1) 
Report on neg. to membership 
Committee active at table (+1) 
Committee active in caucuses 
Newsletter distributed (+1) 
Solidarity days used (+1) 
Editorial visits used (+1) 
i mtgs (+1) 
(+D 
Members vote/revise proposals (+1) 
Contract survey done 1-on-l (• f l ) 
% Unit on negotiating committee (+%) 
Leafleting used (+1) 
Corporate pressure tactics used (+1) 
Intercept 
Proportion 
7.20 
20.63 
0.25 
0.63 
0.78 
0.51 
0.53 
0.53 
4.08 
0.30 
0.41 
0.11 
0.31 
0.72 
0.21 
0.06 
0.37 
0.61 
0.18 
0.30 
0.37 
0.36 
0.50 
5.30 
0.03 
0.13 
0.11 
0.38 
0.85 
0.45 
0.77 
0.38 
0.30 
0.06 
0.75 
0.55 
0.06 
0.26 
0.15 
0.15 
% Contract 
Rate* 
NA 
NA 
,80(.80) 
.78(,84) 
.79(.79) 
.84(76) 
.79(.81) 
.87(.72) 
NA 
.90(75) 
.83(79) 
.91(79) 
.84(78) 
.88(,61) 
.67(,84) 
.50(.82) 
70(.86) 
75(.87) 
,67(.83) 
73(.83) 
.59(.92) 
.83(79) 
76(.84) 
NA 
NA 
.85(79) 
72(.81) 
.92(73) 
.81(73) 
80(.80) 
.84(.65) 
.84(70) 
77(.81) 
.83(.80) 
79(,84) 
78(.82) 
NA 
.81(.80) 
.93(77) 
,93(.77) 
Coefficient 
-0.103 
0.378" 
5.839* 
2.010 
2.613 
4.298** 
2.079 
3.376" 
1.552 
3.577* 
2.298 
2.357 
2.782 
5.647*" 
-1.616 
-6.767" 
-2.669* 
-2.610" 
-4.158" 
1.698 
-4.780" 
-0.981 
2.402* 
0.692" 
-23.457*" 
Standard 
Error 
0.376 
0.174 
3.756 
1.408 
2.048 
1.928 
1.762 
1.819 
1.486 
2.212 
1.839 
3.383 
2.317 
2.300 
2.202 
3.402 
1.904 
1.514 
2.414 
1.621 
2.097 
1.344 
1.874 
0.391 
9.817 
Partial 
Derivative 
-0.005 
0.019 
0.291 
0.100 
0.130 
0.214 
0.104 
0.168 
0.077 
0.178 
0.114 
0.117 
0.139 
0.281 
-0.080 
-0.337 
-0.133 
-0.130 
-0.207 
0.085 
-0.238 
-0.049 
0.120 
0.034 
-1.168 
Total # of observations 100.000 
McFaddens Rho-squared 0.675 
2(Log-likelihood) 67.530 
Significance levels: '=.10, "=.05, "'=.01 (one-tailed tests) 
'Percent win rate is listed for all dummy variables when the variable=l (the win rate for when the variable=0 is in parentheses) 
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Data and Methods 
Building on a random sample of 261 NLRB certification elections in 
units with 50 or more eligible voters that took place between July 1986 and 
June 1987, the first contract study surveyed the union representative in 
charge of first contract negotiations for all units in the sample where the 
union won the election. These lead negotiators were asked to complete an 
in-depth survey about the first contract process, including questions 
regarding lead negotiator background, bargaining climate, the negotiations 
process, employer and union tactics during the contract campaign, and the 
actual bargaining outcome. This information was supplemented by data on 
employer and union characteristics, bargaining unit demographics, and 
election background collected as part of the certification elections study. 
Completed first contract surveys were received for 100 out of the 119 units 
in the sample where the union won the election, a response rate of 84%. 
In the model being tested, first contract outcome is estimated to be a 
function of contextual control variables, such as bargaining climate, com-
pany characteristics, and bargaining unit demographics, election back-
ground and election outcome, employer tactics, negotiation process, nego-
tiator background, and union tactics. The first contract equation is 
estimated by a log-likelihood function where the dichotomous dependent 
variable of contract=l and no contract=0 is a function of 1/1(1+exp(xfi)), 
where x.is the vector of independent variables and P is a vector of logit coef-
ficients. Because logit analysis only functions successfully with a sample size 
of 100 if the model is limited to a relatively small number of independent 
variables, the empirical model used only those variables that best capture 
the most important elements of the first contract process. The independent 
variables along with their hypothesized signs are specified in Table 1. 
Results 
Unions were able to obtain a first agreement in 80 out of the 100 units 
in the first contract sample. This 80% first contract rate is slightly higher 
than the rate found by other researchers. In part this is explained by the 
fact that this sample included only units with more than 50 eligible voters, 
which have been found by other studies to have higher first contract rates 
than smaller units (Pavy 1994). However, even with an 80% first contract 
rate, the low election win rate, especially in larger units, means that only 
27% of the workers who voted for the union in the original certification 
election ended up being covered by a union agreement. 
As we can see from Table 1, the use of a rank-and-file intensive cam-
paign strategy was found to have a statistically significant positive effect on 
first contract outcome when we controlled for the influence of contextual 
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variables and employer behavior. The partial derivative for the union tactic 
variable suggests that for every one-unit increase in the "rank-and-file 
intensive campaign variable," the probability of the union winning a first 
contract increases by 3%. 
When we look at the individual union tactics which constitute the rank-
and-file intensive campaign variable, what is most striking is the great vari-
ance in tactics used and the extremely small number of unions in the sample 
that used aggressive and creative rank-and-file intensive strategies during 
the first contract campaign. Less than 20% of those surveyed focused on 
community issues, used either inside strategies or corporate pressure tac-
tics, or continued organizing one-on-one after the election. Less than half 
reported on sidebars to the committee, had the committee play an active 
role in caucuses, and used solidarity days or leafleting. 
The negative or weak positive results for these union tactic variables 
when examined individually seem to show that utilizing some of these tac-
tics but not others can backfire on the union or, at best, render the tactics 
ineffective. When unions use a majority of the rank-and-file intensive tac-
tics, the first contract rate averages 88%. In contrast, when unions utilize 
only one or two of these tactics, the first contract rate averages as low as 
50%. Thus if the union has an active representative committee that never 
reports back to the unit, bargaining unit members may be much less likely 
to trust and fight for the union. It is the cumulative effect of these tactics 
that keeps the membership mobilized and committed, builds public sup-
port, and puts the employer on notice that the workers are committed to 
winning a good agreement and staying unionized. 
Conclusion 
The results from this study confirm that unions can diffuse the negative 
impact of an adverse bargaining climate and/or an aggressive employer 
campaign when they use a multifaceted, rank-and-file intensive campaign 
that focuses on mobilizing the membership to pressure the employer both 
inside and outside the workplace. The results also show that what happens 
at the bargaining table is just one piece of the first contract process. What 
the union does to pressure the employer in the workplace and in the 
broader community matters just as much, if not more, in determining the 
final outcome of the first contract campaign. 
Despite this evidence, only a small number of unions are running rank-
and-file intensive first contract campaigns, even when faced with intense 
employer opposition. What these results make clear is that, when faced 
with aggressive employer opposition at the bargaining table, unions have 
nothing to lose and a great deal to gain by running more aggressive and 
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more membership-intensive first contract campaigns. The benefits of uti-
lizing these tactics may go far beyond the first contract in terms of building 
membership and leadership commitment to the union, developing a sense 
of ownership and real knowledge of the contract, developing community 
contacts and support, and making the employer take the union seriously. In 
contrast, if unions do not follow up certification elections with aggressive, 
rank-and-file intensive first contract campaigns, more and more employers 
will be able to turn union election victories into devastating first contract 
defeats. 
Endnotes 
1
 For a more detailed review of the literature, as well as a complete explanation of 
the theoretical model and hypotheses, please refer to Bronfenbrenner (1993). 
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